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Introduction 
 
Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China has been trying 
to incorporate territories that it perceives as historically Chinese back into China. Amongst 
these territories is a large part of the South China Sea that China considers part of its territory, 
the part China claims is encompassed by the so called nine-dash line (see figure 1). The PRC 
had actually taken over this claim and the nine-dash line from the Republic of China, who had 
already announced an 11-dash line in 1947 before its government had to flee to Taiwan. The 
removal of two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin was seen as a gesture of good will to the 
communists in Vietnam.
1
 China was in no position in 1949 to enforce its claims on the 9-dash 
line and the dispute lay dormant for more than two decades. Some confrontations occurred 
between Vietnam and China in the 1970's and 1980's, during which China seized the Paracel 
Islands from Vietnam.
2
 This was seen as a conflict between two communist countries, and 
little interest was given to the takeover. 
The first action against a nation besides Vietnam in the South China Sea occurred in 
1995, when the Philippines encountered an artificial structure on Mischief Reef, which was 
considered part of the Philippine exclusive economic zone.
3
 Since 1995 and into the 2000's, 
the disputes died down due to increasing diplomatic and economic ties between China and the 
other claimants of Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
4
 Together these 
claims are referred to as the South China Sea disputes, with many overlapping national claims 
(see figure 2). It was assumed that the disputes would eventually be resolved through 
negotiations, but that other interests had pushed the disputes to the background. The disputes 
flared up again in 2010, when China proclaimed the South China Sea part of its core interest.
5
 
They received increased international attention in 2014 when China started to artificially 
increase the size of features in the Spratly Islands. China went even further and started to 
construct military bases on these reclaimed islands to enforce its claims on the region.
6
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These claims and actions however, go against currently established international rules 
and norms such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a treaty 
which China itself has ratified. Regardless of international protest China has continued to 
aggressively pursue these claims in the region, clashing with other governments in the dispute. 
China's forcefulness presents a significant risk for violent escalation, with not only Vietnam 
and the Philippines, who are the primary opponents of China in the disputes, but also with the 
United States. The United States is concerned about the increased assertiveness of China and 
is opposing Chinese claims, trying to make sure that the laws of the Convention are being 
followed.
7
 The South China Sea disputes offers an interesting view into the enforcement of 
Chinese interests that seemingly go against international rules and norms. Is China carrying 
out a neorealist approach regarding its interests in the South China Sea, while ignoring 
international laws and norms? 
To answer this question three considerations need to be made, which will be discussed 
in three chapters. First, what would exactly constitute a neorealist approach and how would 
China's assertiveness in the South China Sea disputes would fit with such an approach. 
Realism will be discussed in combination with views on the international system and 
hegemonic transition theory will be considered. The second chapter will explore the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China's views on UNCLOS and the case that was 
brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 by the Philippines. This will 
provide a legal overview of the South China Sea disputes and the legal position of China in 
them, to consider if China has a claim or if it is going against international law. The final 
chapter will directly look at Chinese interests in the region, discussing recent actions and 
Chinese claims, rejecting some of the possible explanations for why the South China Sea is 
important to China. Considering these actions through a neorealist lens will reveal if there is a 
neorealist approach towards Chinese interests. 
There is a lot of research being done on the South China Sea dispute and the actions of 
China, on which this paper will build. Most of this research relates directly to the disputes and 
the South China Sea, focussing on the regional actions or the implications of it for the U.S. or 
UNCLOS. However, this paper will seek to compare Chinese actions in the South China Sea 
with realist overtones on China's current approach. Furthermore it will argue that some of the 
more popular arguments, that resources or sovereignty are the primary drivers of the disputes, 
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need to be discounted. Focussing on the actual motivations of China that lie behind its actions 
in the South China Sea, will allow this paper to consider the wider implications of Chinese 
actions beyond an isolated case of ignoring international law. This will provide an explanation 
for why China is acting so forceful in the disputes and that it is unlikely China will back down 
or accept arbitration by a third party. 
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Neorealism and the South China Sea 
 
Traditional realism holds that states are egotistic, the international system is anarchic and the 
highest authority within the international system is the state.
8
 All states seek power or 
absolute gains at the cost of others, to enhance their standing and secure their survival in the 
anarchy of the international system. The need of states to secure their survival is the 'security 
dilemma'. In this dilemma, neither party can ever be fully certain about the intentions of the 
other, thus they will keep seeking to increase their power to feel safe. The need of a state to 
increase its power leads to a security competition between countries, in which countries only 
feel secure if their (military) power is larger than that of other states. This drives states to keep 
expanding their forces until they are larger or more advanced than that of the other state, 
which in turn leads the states that are threatened by this expansion to increase their power and 
so on. States might also seek to ally with others to create a 'balance of power' to counter that 
of stronger states. 
Kenneth Waltz introduced the idea of neorealism in his book The Theory of 
International Politics, building upon and restructuring the theory of realism to fit better in the 
world of the Cold War. John Mearsheimer developed the idea of neorealism further, primarily 
in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, and his version of the idea became known as 
offensive realism. Waltz's idea of neorealism became known as defensive realism in response 
to the more offensive concept of Mearsheimer. Defensive realism argues that states don't want 
to maximize gains at all cost, ensuring more peaceful interactions between states as they do 
not seek to maximize gains or power at the cost of each other. Mearsheimer argues that in 
defensive realism, states do not want much more power than what they already posses, while 
an offensive realist state would want to "maximize relative power, with hegemony as their 
ultimate goal."
9
 Mearsheimer in his theory of offensive realism argues that states seek to 
maximize their power compared to that of other states.
10
 Offensive realism contends that due 
to the anarchy in the international order, a hierarchy of power exists, and that states will do 
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whatever is possible to climb in that hierarchy.
11
 In this system, great powers behave 
aggressively to increase their power in order to ensure their survival from other great powers. 
In Waltz's perception, when there is a hierarchy, which for example forms under 
bipolar or U.S. unipolar power, smaller states tend to "jump on the bandwagon".
12
 The 
bandwagon effect means that smaller states side with the stronger power or possibly the rising 
power if its odds of winning a potential competition with the stronger power are perceived as 
credible. According to Waltz, great powers compete to expand their international influence or 
power, as the U.S. and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.
13
 In the case of the South 
China Sea disputes, this means that the actions China is undertaking would have a similar 
intent of expanding its international influence or power. Since China's increased economic 
and military power, the South China Sea disputes are the first large clash with the 
international order built up by the U.S. after the Second World War. After the end of the Cold 
War, the U.S. has been the unipolar superpower in the world and shaped the international 
order even further in its interest. China might come to a point in the future, as a rising great 
power, that it can possibly challenge the U.S. unipolar status. China has a choice to either 
conform to the current international order and rules enforced by the United States, which is 
heavily pushing for a resolution of the disputes through UNCLOS, or pursue national interests 
that directly clash with the system and U.S. hegemony.
14
 The U.S. pivot to Asia is perceived 
as part of great power politics by many realists and certainly China, the U.S. engaging in 
regional security interests and multilateral organizations such as ASEAN seen as a means to 
counter Chinese influence and interests in East Asia.
15
 U.S. leadership in the region and the 
renewal and reinforcement of regional alliances will help the U.S. to enforce the rules of the 
international system and try to contain China.
16
 
Neither defensive or offensive realism are fully correct, as in a perfect defensive realist 
world, wars would not occur if states only focused on their own survival and security, not 
pursuing these interests at the expense of other states. For an offensive realist, wars would be 
almost inevitable, possibly incessant, as states fight to improve their position in the power 
hierarchy. However, China's actions in the South China Sea disputes display certain offensive 
                                                          
11
 Heywood, Global Politics, 241. 
12
 Burchill and Linklater, Theories, 37-38. 
13
 Ibid, 38. 
14
 C. Coker, The Improbable War. China, the United States and the Continuing Logic of Great Power Conflict 
(Oxford 2015) 45. 
15
 M. Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia. Politics, Security and Economic Development 
(Basingstoke 2014) 89. 
16
 Coker, The Improbable War, 46. 
8 
 
realist characteristics. Gaining control over the South China Sea would enable China to 
control military access to the region. It is also a critical shipping route and oil supply route to 
U.S. allies in East Asia, as such China's actions represent both a military and economic 
challenge to the U.S. as hegemon. Giving in to Chinese claims in the South China Sea would 
result in China gaining power at the cost of the United States, and U.S. allies possibly 
wavering in their commitment if China controls some of their vital supply line.
17
 Control over 
the region is also vital to protect the southern flank of the Chinese mainland from the U.S. 
Navy in any future war, as a conflict would first have to be fought in the South China Sea, as 
opposed to close to the Chinese coast. 
Mark Beeson, who has written extensively on East Asian Regionalism, argues that 
many realists "fail" to consider power outside of just pure military power, such as political 
dominance.
18
 However, as will be explained later, China threw away the political advantage 
in the 2010's to pursue its interest in the disputes, causing the other countries in the dispute to 
become more critical and turn to the U.S. for assistance. The new approach seemingly clashed 
with previous efforts by China, unless it wanted to quickly reinforce its position in the South 
China Sea. 
Because hegemony is stated to be the final objective for states in  offensive realism, it 
is important to briefly explore it in the context of the South China Sea disputes. Hegemony 
was a concept founded by Antonio Gramsci in the early 20th century, although Gramsci 
referred to ideological hegemony, replacing norms of others to have your norms become the 
internationally accepted norm.
19
  The concept of hegemony was co-opted by neorealism to 
describe what happened after the Second World War, in which the world politically divided 
into a capitalist U.S. camp and a communist Soviet one. In this understanding of hegemony, 
the hegemon, either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, would pressure countries into adopting 
practices beneficial to the hegemon, such as the U.S. Bretton Woods system or the Soviet 
Warsaw Pact. Hegemony in the realist sense, is thus that the state or states which are the most 
powerful in the hierarchy of states, are able to enforce a certain international system. After the 
end of the Second World War, the system of alliances, international organizations and norms 
the U.S. had set up, is often referred to as a hegemonic system or termed U.S. Empire, which 
survived the Cold War leaving U.S. left as the sole superpower since 1991. The value in the 
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idea that the U.S. is a hegemonic power, is in the assumption that the rules China is currently 
ignoring are those set up by the U.S. and its allies. Therefore, China ignoring international 
rules can be seen as a possible start of hegemonic transition, or a move away from a unipolar 
U.S. system. 
Competition between states is the core of hegemonic transition theory.
20
 Rising 
powers in history often challenge the international order and established powers. When 
looking at hegemonic transition, realists are still focussed on power of the state, mainly its 
military power. In this sense, the U.S. has not yet lost its position and is still far stronger than 
China. China might not be able to directly challenge the U.S. for power in East Asia currently, 
it is working to improve its relative power compared to that of the U.S. in the South China 
Sea disputes. The U.S. is invested in the established order, as it benefits from the rules and 
norms, as the hegemon that set up the international system from which these rules and norms 
originated from in the first place. However, it is hard to assess what shape a hegemonic 
transition would take, or what form a more direct competition between China and the U.S. 
might take. There has been only one hegemonic transition in history, when the United 
Kingdom was overtaken by the U.S. in its leading position in the international system. Many 
policy makers in China ascribe to realist ideas, it being the dominant school of thought in 
foreign policy in China as well as in the United States.
21
 Realism being so dominant could 
indicate that China might be willing to engage in hegemonic competition over the South 
China Sea, as explained by Kamrul Hossain:  
"China's growing naval capacity and increased surveillance, as well as its control over 
the SCS, leave both the U.S. and its regional allies (the ASEAN countries) with larger 
concerns. These concerns have been exacerbated by China's reasserting its sovereignty claims 
in the SCS, directly or indirectly threatening the U.S. interests."
22
   
An increase of Chinese power by militarizing its possessions in the South China Sea, 
would be a direct challenge to the U.S. as hegemon in East Asia. As the hegemon, the idea is 
that the U.S. will attempt to maintain this advantage and will not accept equals, as under the 
power structure of offensive realism countries strive to preserve the balance of power in their 
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favour.
23
 It is unclear if China is interested in taking over the role of hegemon from the U.S. 
in the future. As Salvador S.F. Regilme and James Parisot note, China might never fully 
follow the path of hegemonic transition theory or offensive realism, where the objective is to 
become hegemon: 
"China may not become a new world hegemon. For one, the Chinese state seems to 
lack a universal ideology equivalent to the US’s self-proclaimed ‘exceptionalism’ and right to 
intervene and control world affairs in the ostensible context of the greater good. But while the 
US economy struggles to gain ground, and the US ability to shape global politics declines, it 
may be that we are moving towards—or are already in—a multipolar world."24 
China might never become interested in acquiring hegemony in the same way the U.S. 
has acquired it after the end of the Second World War, although it is interested in reducing 
U.S. hegemony in East Asia. The disputes might present a significant early step in that 
direction. China is not ready to take on the U.S. in direct competition and is moving carefully 
but forcefully in the South China Sea. China's rapid takeover of features in the Spratlys and 
the construction of islands and military facilities have presented the U.S. with a fait accompli. 
This has left the U.S. to react to strong Chinese initiatives, about which it can do very little, 
less the U.S. risk a violent confrontation. A violent confrontation is certainly a risk, as the 
shift between a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar world could be subjected to great power 
struggles and war, as evidenced by both World Wars and the Cold War. This is why resolving 
the South China Sea disputes peacefully, would be an important indicator of the U.S.-China 
relationship in East Asia. The manner in which the disputes are resolved would also be an 
important indicator of the balance of power between the two. Currently resolution appears far 
off, with U.S. military ships breaching, in what the U.S. terms freedom of navigation 
operations, what China considers its 'territorial waters' close to Chinese features and China 
responding with shows of force to see of these U.S. ships. 
Chinese policy makers have maintained that China has no hegemonic or imperialistic 
interests.
25
 China has not engaged in many distinctive great power politics, such as acquiring 
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bases in other countries or building alliances.
26
 Nevertheless, with China's massive economic 
power and growing military might, the South China Sea disputes might be the first core 
interest of China in which it is determined to push its interests in opposition to the United 
States. Mearsheimer believes that although the U.S. is the preeminent power in the world, 
China already is a great power. In his view, China's rise will inevitably lead it to seek control 
over Asia as the U.S. has done in the past with both North and South America.
27
 In his view, 
China will eventually compete with the U.S. in Asia and will perhaps start doing so on a 
global scale to weaken and distract the U.S. from its commitments in Asia. 
Finally, it is important to consider realism's views on the international system, that 
produced laws such as UNCLOS which are at the core of the disputes. The realist approach 
sees little value in international laws and norms, those being reduced to variables in power 
struggles between countries.
28
 Robert Gilpin in War and Change in World Politics provided 
an authoritative realist view of the international system and power within it. Gilpin argued 
that the different rate of change in the distribution of power internationally and with various 
other parts of the system leads to a "disjuncture".
29
 This disjuncture erodes the balance of 
power and creates tension or instability. During these periods rising powers will promote their 
interests by trying to reshape the international system. Mearsheimer argues that the 
international system "creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain 
power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits 
outweigh the costs."
30
 As a rising power it is thus expected that China would try to take 
advantage of the international system and try to reshape it in its favour, as it is attempting to 
do with international law concerning the South China Sea. When considering global 
governance, the management of problems at an international level through organizations and 
laws, China has gone through several phases. According to David Shambaugh, in his book 
China Goes Global, China has now adopted a: 
 "moderately revisionist posture since 2008 that seeks to selectively alter rules, actors, 
and the 'balance of influence' largely from within existing institutions-while simultaneously 
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trying to establish alternative institutions and norms of global governance and redistribute 
power and resources within the international system."
31
  
China's actions in the South China Sea do not fit with this description, as it is ignoring 
UNCLOS. China is not trying to alter existing rules, it is trying to undermine their application 
to suit its interests. In the case of the South China Sea, China has shown no interest in the 
international system to solve the disputes. China does not recognize international laws that 
would rule in the favour of other claimants, denying that those laws are applicable. In the 
South China Sea disputes, the international norms and rules seem to have little influence on 
the behaviour and actions of China. China joined what it sees as a Western international 
community in the 19
th
 century, when it was forcibly opened up by Western powers such as the 
United Kingdom.
32
 China still views the international system as a method by which the U.S. 
seeks to control and contain the rise of China.
33
 This control would be exercised by using 
international laws, such as UNCLOS, to block China from pursuing its international interests. 
Some Chinese scholars even question the universal values of the international system as being 
a Western product designed to serve the current hegemon.
34
 As Shambaugh puts it, China's 
distrust of global governance or the international system comes from its "suspicions that 
global governance is just the latest American or Western 'trap' to retard China's growth and 
manipulate it internationally…".35 China's disdain for the international rules in the disputes 
can be more easily understood from this approach. 
Realism has its limits; many interactions on an international level go beyond the 
simple act of maximizing power and the explanations of realism.
36
Nonetheless, China's 
motivations in the South China Sea disputes can be best understood when considered from a 
realist perspective: from its dismissal of international norms and rules, to its actions aimed at 
addressing its security dilemma. To continue, the international laws that are applicable to the 
South China Sea disputes will need to be explored, in order to explain China's motivations in 
ignoring these laws.  
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International law, UNCLOS and the PCA 
 
The international agreement most frequently mentioned in connection to the South China Sea 
disputes, is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UNCLOS, signed in 1982, 
was meant to regulate the use of the seas, oceans and the resources they contain. Currently 
166 countries have ratified the Convention, including China.
37
 UNCLOS went into force in 
1994, once the 60
th
 state ratified the Convention. UNCLOS contains articles on how to 
determine territorial sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf. 
Territorial sea over which countries have full sovereignty extends 12 nautical miles (22.8 km) 
from the low-water line of coast of a country, the EEZ extends 200 nautical miles at most 
(370km).
38
 The EEZ gives the country to which it belongs to sole access to its natural 
resources, both in the sea and under the seabed. The continental shelf extends 200 nautical 
miles, although that can be extended by meeting certain requirements in the Convention. 
Features in the sea or ocean are further subdivided into three categories, islands, rocks and 
low-tide elevations. In this division islands would be able to sustain habitation or an economy, 
rocks which enable neither and low-tide features which would be above water during low tide 
only.
39
 
To explain the difference between a rock and an island, Part VIII, Regime of Islands, 
article 121, paragraph 3, is helpful, stating that: "Rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf."
40
 Islands under UNCLOS are the most valuable commodity in the South China Sea 
disputes, as they are able to claim both a territorial sea and an EEZ around it. Rocks are only 
be able to claim a territorial sea without an EEZ. Low-tide elevations can't make a claim to 
either a territorial sea or an EEZ according to the Convention, unless they lie within 12 
nautical miles of the territorial sea. In that case, low-tide elevations can be used as a 
measuring point for the 12 nautical miles of territorial sea and the 200 nautical miles of the 
EEZ. 
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The island definition is the most tenuous when it comes to the South China Sea 
disputes, partly because UNCLOS never really specifies what constitutes either human 
habitation of economic life. None of the islands have had any permanent inhabitants, Taiwan, 
Vietnam and the Philippines all try to maintain civilian populations on several islands to make 
them eligible for both a territorial sea and an EEZ under the Convention.
41
 In 2014, when 
China started to artificially construct islands on features that did not lie in its EEZ but in that 
of the Philippines under UNCLOS, it clearly breached the Convention on Part V, Exclusive 
Economic Zone, article 56, paragraph 1(b): 
"jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard 
to: (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;"
 42
 
Under article 56 it is clear that only the Philippines could have given permission for 
the legal construction of islands and structures on reefs that are within its EEZ. On what these 
Chinese constructions can claim, UNCLOS is also clear in Part V, article 60, paragraph 8: 
"Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. 
They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of 
the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf."
43
 
This means that under the Convention, the islands that China has constructed are in 
itself illegal; China also cannot claim a territorial sea around them, in which it can block the 
vessels of other countries, or an EEZ. Nevertheless, China has repeatedly arrested fishermen 
in the South China Sea for fishing in its EEZ and harassed ships for entering its 'territorial sea' 
around these artificial constructions.
44
 
China is in fact a party to UNCLOS, and ratified it in 1996. Four years before ratifying 
UNCLOS, China unilaterally declared its sovereignty in the South China Sea region. China 
clearly stated this in February of 1992, when it adopted the "Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone". This was an attempt to preempt the 
possible nullification of its claims by UNCLOS that would go into effect in 1994. The law 
claimed sovereignty over: 
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"The land territory of the People's Republic of China includes the mainland of the 
People's Republic of China and its coastal islands; Taiwan and all islands appertaining thereto 
including the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands; the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha Islands; the Xisha 
[Paracel] Islands; the Zhongsha [Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal] Islands and the 
Nansha [Spratly] Islands; as well as all the other islands belonging to the People's Republic of 
China."
45
 
This law would not preserve Chinese claims once it ratified UNCLOS however. The 
only declaration China has made after ratification has been in 2006:  
"The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the 
procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the 
categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the 
Convention."
46
 
This opt out enabled China not to accept a third party ruling by a tribunal or court, 
who would have jurisdiction over disputes under UNCLOS. These disputes include 
"Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts", 
"Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts" and "Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts".
47
 
The claims China has made go well beyond the EEZ it would be allowed to claim 
under UNCLOS and directly clash with the legal claims of the other nations. As China does 
not own any feature that could be considered an island in the Spratlys, it can't claim any EEZ 
in the region, it does continue to claim an EEZ in the region however (see figure 3 for an EEZ 
map drawn from the shores of respective countries, ignoring those of possible islands). 
Effectively China's ratification of UNCLOS would have nullified its claims in the region. 
Under UNCLOS China would have signed away its historic rights, as they are not recognized 
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by the Convention, because they cannot be applied to open ocean.
4849
 China argued that it has 
historical rights that would predate the Convention and thus would not be nullified by it.
50
 
In normal cases, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea would rule in 
disputes such as that in the South China Sea, considering what islands and features would 
merit a territorial sea and possibly an EEZ. The risk here however, involves possibly having 
to surrender sovereignty to other claimants, so China is not willing to let the disputes go to the 
Tribunal.
51
 China does not want arbitration in the case of the South China Sea and prefers 
bilateral negotiations, where its economic size can work to its advantage in applying pressure 
to the Philippines and Vietnam. As arbitration via UNCLOS would not gain the approval of 
China, the Philippines decided to go to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in January 
of 2013. The Philippine decision to go to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, was made to 
determine what features China claimed would actually constitute islands with their own EEZ, 
deliberately not having the PCA rule on matters of sovereignty to avoid a clash with China on 
its opt out. In this way, the Philippines could circumvent historic claims by China, the PCA 
would just make clear if China could only claim territorial sea around each feature, as most of 
what they possessed in the Spratlys were little more than rocks.
52
 China protested the decision 
by the Philippines to go to the PCA, referring to the fact that the Philippines was not allowed 
to unilaterally seek arbitration according to article 281 of UNCLOS, because both countries 
would have to: 
"have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, 
the procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by 
recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further 
procedure."
53
 
Avoiding the discussion on sovereignty enabled the Philippines to acquire a ruling on 
certain Chinese claims to territorial seas and EEZs, regardless of whether China would accept 
it. After a case of more than three years, the PCA gave its award in July of 2016. On the 
ruling of China's rights to the resources in the South China Sea the PCA ruled as following: 
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"the Tribunal concludes that China’s claim to historic rights to the living and non-
living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’ is incompatible with the Convention to the extent 
that it exceeds the limits of China’s maritime zones as provided for by the Convention…  
Accordingly, upon China’s accession to the Convention and its entry into force, any historic 
rights that China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash 
line’ were superseded, as a matter of law and as between the Philippines and China, by the 
limits of the maritime zones provided for by the Convention."
54
 
China cannot unilaterally lay claim to the resources in the EEZ of other nations and 
deny those resources to those nations. The PCA ruling continued on what should be 
considered fit for human habitation, as this was left unspecified under UNCLOS: 
"As noted above with respect to low-tide elevations, many of the high-tide features in 
the Spratly Islands have been subjected to substantial human modification as large 
installations and airstrips have been constructed on them. Desalination facilities have been 
installed and tillable soil introduced. In some cases, it is now difficult to observe directly the 
original status of the feature in its natural state. In such circumstances, the Tribunal considers 
that the Convention requires that the status of a feature be ascertained on the basis of its 
earlier, natural condition, prior to the onset of significant human modification, taking into 
account the best available evidence of the previous status of the high-tide features, before 
intensive modification."
55
 
According to the PCA, the modifications made by China, or other claimants if taken 
into a broader perspective, to make it suitable for human habitation should not be considered 
when assessing if a feature should be considered an island worthy of its own EEZ. Johnson 
Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Gaven Reef (North) in the Spratlys were part of 
the PCA's ruling on whether they should be considered islands. China has constructed 
installations on and also expanded some of these features with land reclamation. However, it 
was ruled that these actions do not elevation these rocks to island status.
56
 In the case of 
Mischief Reef the PCA ruled that China had "unlawfully interfered with the Philippines’ 
enjoyment of its sovereign rights."
57
 China is in clear violation of international rules and 
norms with its actions according to a third party ruling under UNCLOS, even though China 
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claimed during the PCA that it had "indisputable sovereignty" under international law, 
"including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea".
58
 This has proven to be 
false by the PCA. The overall ruling on the lawfulness of China's actions was a significant 
victory for the Philippines on the matters the PCA could rule on: 
"The Tribunal next considered the lawfulness of Chinese actions in the South China 
Sea. Having found that certain areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the 
Philippines, the Tribunal found that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its 
exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, 
(b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in 
the zone. The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) 
had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these 
rights in restricting access. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels 
had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine 
vessels."
59
 
The PCA could not rule if China had aggravated the dispute, as military activities were 
excluded from the settlement. Nevertheless, the PCA has no enforcement mechanism and the 
ruling did not present any legally binding actions that had to be taken. This has made the 
victory a largely symbolic one, the award was nevertheless criticized by China. China 
responded swiftly to the PCA award and released a strongly worded statement the next day. 
The statement again made clear that China did not adhere to UNCLOS rules in the disputes 
and blamed the Philippines for seeking arbitration: 
"In January 2013, the then government of the Republic of the Philippines turned its 
back on the above-mentioned consensus and commitment, and unilaterally initiated the South 
China Sea arbitration. The Philippines deliberately mischaracterized and packaged the 
territorial issue which is not subject to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the maritime delimitation dispute which has been excluded from the 
UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures by China’s 2006 optional exceptions declaration 
pursuant to Article 298 of UNCLOS. This act is a wanton abuse of the UNCLOS dispute 
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settlement procedures. In doing so, the Philippines attempts to deny China’s territorial 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea."
60
 
In the document, China repeats its historical claims in the region and gives historical 
background information to the claims from the position of China. It also repeats that it has 
territorial sovereignty even over low-tide or underwater features, that would not generate any 
territorial sea. Tellingly, however, China did reject the idea that underwater features could 
claim a territorial sea in a dispute between it and South Korea, following the rules of 
UNCLOS.
61
 It is clear that China is ignoring international rules that do not benefit its interests. 
The statement continues, mentioning that the Philippines "illegally" constructed military 
facilities, yet does not mention that China itself is also doing so on disputed islands, as the 
PCA award made clear.
62
 While China has rejected arbitration or the use of UNCLOS 
procedure in the South China Sea it stated that it is: 
"committed to upholding and promoting international rule of law. It respects and acts 
in accordance with international law."
63
 
China's actions or claims in the South China Sea do not correspond to any recognized 
international laws, a third party arbitration would almost certainly not rule in favour of China. 
So China's statement that it is committed to "upholding and promoting" international law in 
the case of the South China Sea is a paradox. Nevertheless China accuses other claimants of 
breaching international norms with "illegal claims and occupation"
64
 The statement kept 
returning to the argument that the dispute should be settled by negotiations according to 
international law. In the same document, however, also insisted that it would not recognize 
any action that might jeopardize its interests in the South China Sea: 
"China maintains that the issue of maritime delimitation in the South China Sea should 
be settled equitably through negotiation with countries directly concerned in accordance with 
international law, including UNCLOS… China does not accept any unilateral action 
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attempting to enforce maritime claims against China. Nor does China recognize any action 
that may jeopardize its maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea."
65
 
This presents another interesting paradox: if China considers the South China Sea 
region it claims as a core interest, how would it ever give in to any negotiations in which it 
might have to give up part of these core interests? Furthermore, China still seems to be intent 
on using its economic size in bilateral negotiations and rules out any mediators, stating that it 
would not accept "any recourse to third-party settlement."
66
 The sentiments of the Chinese 
government are echoed by its scholars, such as Qingguo Jia, who maintains for example that: 
"China has engaged in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and is 
making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters."
67
 
Chinese actions do not show that China is all that interested in negotiating a peaceful 
settlement that is not on its terms, it even made clear it would not "recognize any action that 
may jeopardize its… interests". 68  The construction of military facilities and even whole 
islands in the South China Sea indicate that China is intending to stay in the area for a long 
time, before the disputes have even been resolved. The peaceful intentions Qingguo or the 
government are trying to convey, are not at all apparent to the other nations. As the PCA 
award has shown, Chinese law enforcement vessels have already acted unlawfully according 
to international law in just the dispute with the Philippines. While Chinese rhetoric promises a 
course of action that upholds the international law, its representatives in the South China Sea 
have acted in breach of it. China has seemingly ignored international laws governing the 
freedom of navigation through the EEZ as well, frequently treating its EEZ as an extension of 
its territorial sea, trying to regulate mainly military traffic passing through it.
69
 
China has never properly explained what the 9-dash line actually represents and 
clarifications of it have been contradictory.
70
 China is founding its claims on historic rights in 
the region and claiming those rights is the current line of argumentation that China is pushing. 
China argues the Chinese state in various forms has been aware and active around the islands 
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in the South China Sea disputes for over 2000 years.
71
 These claims are tenuous at best, as 
most of the countries neighbouring the South China Sea have had a history of interaction in 
the region. China argues that it first discovered and took advantage of them. However, there 
was no real state control over any of the islands by any of its current claimants before the 
Second World War.
72
 When the 1947 claims were made by the ROC, none of the other states 
currently in the disputes protested, which is agued by China to be an "act of acquiescence" to 
the 9-dash line. This means that when a claim is made, and other states do not protest this 
claim, consent is implicitly given to this claim.
73
 The other claimants have countered that 
when these claims were made by the ROC, they were still under colonial rule and as such 
could not officially protest. Other parts of international law that could be applicable such as 
discovery of the features, the relative distance of them to the claimants and control over them 
could cover the claims made by all the states in the disputes.
74
 Historic rights are not 
necessarily in favour of China, and as stated in many cases they are overruled by UNCLOS. 
Even if the South China Sea disputes were taken to court by all parties and China was 
awarded ownership of every rock and island, it would not give China the extensive areas 
claimed of the 9-dash line.
75
 The 9-dash line would contain large chunks of EEZ's of other 
countries even with that outcome. China is clearly in breach of international law and norms 
with its actions in the South China Sea. Based on UNCLOS and the PCA award it seems clear 
that China's claimed historical rights will also not be upheld during third party arbitration. 
From a neorealist perspective on the international order, it seems clear that China is rejecting 
the international laws that would be applicable to its interest in the South China Sea. 
Rejecting or ignoring international laws is also one of the first steps in hegemonic transition 
theory. However, while China seems to be rejecting international laws when it comes to the 
claims of its opponents, it does seemingly want to enforce these laws when they are to its 
advantage. This can be viewed as an attempt to maximize its power in the South China Sea 
disputes regarding the international system, as China is claiming the full extent of jurisdiction 
it can get under laws such as UCLOS, yet undermining the power of the other states as they 
posses under UNCLOS. China has no strong legal basis to any of its claims, so the motivation 
behind pursuing those needs further explaining.  
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China's interests in the South China Sea 
 
China has had long standing territorial disputes with the other countries neighbouring the 
South China Sea, mainly Vietnam and the Philippines. China is relatively the furthest away 
from its claims in the Spratlys, compared to the other countries involved. China maintains that 
the islands in the South China Sea were Chinese territory, conquered by Japan in the Second 
World War and should therefore be returned.
76
 The disputes have seen two violent incidents 
that both originated with China occupying claimed territories. In 1974, China seized the 
Paracel Islands from South Vietnam and in 1988, when it came to a deadly confrontation with 
Vietnam over islands in the Spratly Islands.
77
 Little interest was paid to those two events, as 
South Vietnam was close to collapse, which would follow only a year later in 1975, and the 
conflict between two communist countries in 1988 was of little interest to most powers, 
including the United States.
78
 The United States, at multiple times, expressed neutrality 
towards the South China Sea disputes, as long as they would be resolved peacefully.
79
 
Chinese actions in the South China Sea region involving taking over possession of 
islands and other features had started before 1995, but had only involved Vietnam. Not much 
attention was given to 1992 "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone" at the time. Three years later, China first started acting on its claims on 
features that were in the Philippine EEZ under UNCLOS. 
The shift in the approach to Chinese claims occurred in 1995, when the Philippines 
discovered a Chinese structure built on Mischief Reef, part of the Spratlys, within the EEZ of 
the Philippines.
80
 It was one of the first locations where such constructions would be 
undertaken by China in the South China Sea, in the EEZ of the Philippines. The resulting 
diplomatic backlash convinced China to proceed more cautiously for a number of years after 
1995. China resolved to strengthen diplomatic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Increasing economic cooperation with trade and bilateral investment 
during the late 1990's and 2000's would push the disputes to the background.
81
 During this 
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period of friendlier relations with its South China Sea neighbours, China showed itself 
prepared to sign the ASEAN "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" 
in 2002, in which the parties wrote that they were: 
"COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious 
environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of 
peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region… The Parties reaffirm their 
commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.." 
82
 
This was not a legally binding agreement, it functioned as a statement of goodwill 
between the parties to solve the disputes and observe international laws, specifically 
UNCLOS. The disputes were also directly addressed in the Declaration: 
"4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional 
disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly 
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with 
universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea; 
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that 
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, 
refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, 
and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner."
83
 
This engagement in multilateral diplomacy on the South China Sea disputes, seemed 
to indicate to its neighbours that China would eventually accept negotiations over the 
territorial disputes.
84
 ASEAN assumed that it was possible to engage with China and reach a 
mutually beneficial solution regarding claims and resources.
85
 However, China insists on 
bilateral negotiations on the disputes, not wanting to have multilateral negotiations through 
ASEAN, as China can use its economic and political size against rivals in bilateral 
negotiations. 
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An assumption that was made by some experts was that these diplomatic and 
economic overtures, were an element in a "ripe fruit" or "keeping a low profile" strategy.
8687
 
In this strategy, China's attempts at pushing for economic and diplomatic cooperation were 
seen as an attempt to temporarily halt discussions about the South China Sea disputes. The 
strategy would involve distracting the other parties in the disputes with economic benefits, 
while China continued building up its military force and economy even further. At one point 
the power balance would favor China to such an extent, that it could simply press it demands,  
making the other nations fold, having its interests fall into China's hands like "ripe fruit".
88
 
Whether the "ripe fruit" strategy was real or not, increased Chinese assertiveness towards its 
claims in the second half of the 2000's caused the benefits of that cooperation to be lost, with 
the other countries in the disputes reasserting their claims as well. From China's perspective, 
the argumentation about why this strategy of "keeping a low profile" failed, was that it was no 
longer working properly. This was due to the obvious growth of the economic power of China 
and increased U.S. interest in the region as a consequence of that growth.
89
 A more direct 
neorealist approach was seemingly chosen, with Chinese economic and diplomatic soft power 
being abandoned in favor of a more forceful course of action. 
After 2007, China started changing its approach once more regarding the territorial 
disputes, incorporating the administrations of its Paracel and Spratly territories into the 
administration of the Hainan province. In 2010, this was followed by a declaration listing the 
South China Sea claims amongst core interests such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.
90
 This 
meant that China is prepared to defend its claims with military force. These actions thwarted 
the "ripe fruit" strategy, as declaring them core interests showed the other nations in the 
disputes that China was not interested in negotiations. In response to complaints about this 
new Chinese assertiveness by ASEAN leaders and Chinese actions against U.S. ships, the U.S. 
offered to aid in multilateral negotiations on the South China Sea disputes, a departure from 
the U.S. policy of non-involvement.
91
 The active U.S. involvement in the South China Sea 
disputes was set in motion in 2009, when a U.S. Navy research vessel named the Impeccable 
was harassed in international waters by alleged Chinese 'fishermen', with a Chinese Navy ship 
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present.
92
 Although this motivation for more active U.S. involvement has been dismissed by 
some Chinese scholars as an "ambiguous justification".
93
 This event being the catalyst of U.S. 
involvement is indeed possible, China's increased assertiveness in the region has worried the 
U.S. and the attempted pivot to Asia by the administration of President Obama was seen as a 
response to this.
94
 The pivot fits in neorealist theory and also hegemonic transition theory. 
China's attempt to expand its power by securing its interests in the South China Sea has 
caused the U.S. as hegemon to react, trying to prevent China from strengthening its power 
base in the region, simultaneously protecting the interests of itself and its allies. 
China imagined in the late 2000's that a 'spheres of influence' deal could perhaps be 
made with the United States, especially after the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008.
95
 In return for increased economic cooperation the U.S. 
would not involve itself in the South China Sea disputes. In 2010, before the ASEAN regional 
forum in Vietnam, China requested from the U.S. State Department that it would not to bring 
up the South China Sea disputes.
96
 This failed, and the U.S. not only brought up the disputes, 
it signaled a willingness to become more actively involved. Then Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton spoke at the subsequent ASEAN regional forum meeting in Vietnam, in 2010, stating 
that: 
“The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to 
Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea.”97 
Although the U.S. still claimed to be neutral in which party had the strongest claim, it 
did signal that it was prepared to aid multilateral talks on the disputes. U.S. involvement is to 
the detriment of China, as U.S. support can embolden the other claimants and give less room 
for China to pressure or coerce them in bilateral talks, where the balance of power heavily 
favoured China. China sees the 2010 statement by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as 
multilateral interference policy that is interfering by promoting a multilateral negotiation on 
the issue, which China does not want.
98
 U.S. emphasis on solving the disputes in accordance 
with the rules of UNCLOS directly clashed with Chinese interests to resolve it based on 
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historical claims. China's assertiveness and now U.S. involvement due to that assertiveness, 
have left ASEAN with very few means to negotiate with China, as the disputes have now 
developed into a more direct strategic competition.
99
 China has also put pressure on ASEAN 
not to take a unified stance on the disputes, which succeeded in 2012, when ASEAN refused 
to even bring out a communiqué on the South China Sea and no progress was made on a 
binding Code of Conduct.
100
 
Chinese scholars point out the seeming paradox in claiming that China is being 
assertive in the South China Sea. In November of 2013, for example, China declared an Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, which would require all aircraft 
flying through to submit a flight plan and transponder information. This zone also included 
the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu), the islands being under control of Japan but disputed and 
claimed by China. The zone is being actively ignored by the U.S. and Japan, who do not 
recognize its legitimacy. It is pointed out by Chinese scholars that China has not declared 
such a defense zone over the South China Sea.
101
 Although this is true, it has to be mentioned 
that in the Senkaku dispute, China did not engage in the illegal construction of islands and 
facilities like it has done in the South China Sea. Discounting increased Chinese assertiveness 
on the arbitrary lack of a declaration of an ADIZ in the South China Sea region, after the one 
over the Senkaku Islands had already been ignored by the international community, seems to 
be neglecting the bigger picture or downplaying Chinese actions. Some Chinese scholars have 
a different perspective on the tensions as worded by Yinhong Shi: 
"However, as with the situation over the Diaoyu Islands, in the first half of 2012 the 
dispute was renewed with high intensity, mainly because of provocative actions taken by the 
Philippines government over Huangyan Island (the Scarborough Shoal) in violation of 
Chinese sovereign and maritime rights."
102
 
Or as You Ji describes it: 
"To Beijing and particularly to the PLA, the United States’ repeated naval intrusions 
into the 12-nautical mile territorial waters of China-held islands in the name of freedom of 
navigation have increased the prospects of physical contacts of the warships involved. This 
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has contributed to militarisation of the SCS affairs, escalating the possibility of standoffs 
between the two nuclear powers."
103
 
Here, the element of Chinese sovereignty once again comes forward. China cannot be 
at fault, because China has sovereignty in the area, unlike the other nations, even though this 
is not recognized internationally or by law. The Chinese government wants to claim the 
region out of security interests and these explanations of Chinese sovereignty shift the blame 
on other nations. In the view of China, all of its actions have been undertaken in an area they 
have unquestionable sovereignty over. Nevertheless, as seen in the examination of UNCLOS 
and the PCA award on certain aspects, such as construction of islands, China's actions in the 
South China Sea leave little doubt internationally that China is the party at fault. A more 
neorealist tendency is also revealed in the Chinese thinking about the disputes, as Zhou 
Fangyin mentions: 
"It is generally accepted in the Chinese debates that if China were to adopt a restrained 
and moderate policy on this issue for a considerable length of time, this could prompt certain 
countries to become more demanding in their relations with China. Restraint and moderation 
could thus lead to direct damage to China’s national interests…104" 
If China is being too forceful in its claims it could provoke stronger reactions from the 
U.S. and the other countries involved in the disputes and "engender widespread misgivings" 
about China's "intentions".
105
 This is close to realist thinking, that countries try to maximize 
their gains. As China reasons that if it had not chosen to undertake these actions, other 
countries would have tried to maximize their power or interests at the cost of China's core 
interests. Again, this perception shifts the blame to the other claimants in the South China Sea, 
because China has to act before the others directly damage China's national interests, in an 
area that is considered to be part of China. This is also how Chinese President Xi Jinping 
perceives the South China Sea disputes, as You explains: 
"Internationally, Xi has pursued assertiveness from a position of relative weakness 
amid rising U.S. pressure. In handling sovereignty conflicts, Xi seems to emulate Mao 
Zedong, adopting a game of brinkmanship to pre-empt any anticipated provocations and avert 
full-scale clashes in order to protect China’s overall national interests despite the high risks… 
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At an internal meeting prior to the 12 July 2016 announcement of the arbitration verdict, Xi 
called for pre-emptive actions in the SCS, “otherwise China’s Spratly presence would be over 
time hollowed out, leaving the Chinese with only claims on paper”."106 
In this sense, the Chinese government certainly views the South China Sea disputes as 
a realist power struggle, where China needs to maximize its gains so as not to lose out. 
Nevertheless, Zhou argues that the South China Sea disputes are only a single part of the 
China's foreign policy objectives, and not even an important part. This is evidenced according 
to Zhou, by two of the highest level conferences of the PRC since 1949 on foreign policy. The 
Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference in 2013 and the Central Conference on Work 
Relating to Foreign Affairs in 2014, both did not mention the South China Sea in their public 
documents.
107
 These conferences would supposedly indicate that the South China Sea 
disputes were not among the primary foreign policy concerns for China. However, an 
important note on that, is that those were only the public documents that were released after 
these two conferences, there is no indication if the South China Sea interests might have been 
discussed in private or withheld from the public record. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess if 
China would put the disputes on the agenda in a foreign policy conference, adamant as China 
is that the South China Sea is an integral part of China's territory, over which they have full 
sovereignty, meaning it could be treated as a domestic topic. An opposite view to that of Zhou 
is presented by Bonnie Glaser, who in a prepared statement to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs 
Committee stated that: 
"China’s behavior in the South China Sea is deliberate and systematic; its actions are 
not the unintentional result of bureaucratic politics and poor coordination. In fact, the spate of 
actions by China in recent months suggests exemplary interagency coordination, civil-military 
control and harmonization of its political, economic and military objectives. The clear pattern 
of bullying and intimidation of the other claimants is evidence of a top leadership decision to 
escalate China’s coercive diplomacy."108 
It is hard to argue with the idea that the actions involving Chinese vessels and the 
construction of artificial islands and installations happened without the approval of the highest 
level of China's government. With actions violating international rules and norms, it is clear 
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that these are not the actions easily undertaken by lower levels of government. The potential 
for international incidents when illegally constructing in another country's EEZ is just too 
large not to have had approval from the top level of government. The fact that there have been 
no reactions from the Chinese government except statements that they have sovereignty and 
the Philippines are in the wrong, further undermines the claim that the South China Sea is not 
an important foreign policy objective. Some claims have been made that the importance to 
China of the South China Sea disputes lie in the reserves of resources, such as natural gas and 
oil under the seabed, this claim needs to be examined. 
All the countries involved in the disputes are interested in the resources that can be 
found in the South China Sea. It is still debated if China would be so assertive over its claims, 
if not for the natural resources in the region. In 2010, when the disputes started to flare up 
again, China was dependent on two thirds of its oil being imported, as such it was argued that 
oil in the South China Sea could be present an important domestic supply.
109
 China has 
repeatedly clashed with Vietnam and the Philippines when they attempted to survey new oil 
fields, which China claims is breaching its sovereignty, as these attempts fall within the 9-
dash line. China has been seeking to end any resource exploitation in the 9-dash line by other 
parties.
110
 It is not exactly clear how large the oil reserves in the South China Sea might be. 
However, the resource argument for China's interests seems quite weak when the current 
known and probable reserves in the South China Sea are looked at (see figure 4), the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration has commented that: 
"analysis shows that most fields containing discovered oil and natural gas are clustered 
in uncontested parts of the South China Sea, close to shorelines of the coastal countries, and 
not near the contested islands. Industry sources suggest almost no oil and less than 100 billion 
cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves exist in fields near the Spratly 
Islands. The Paracel Island territory has even less natural gas and no oil… In addition to 
proved and probable reserves, the South China Sea may have additional hydrocarbons in 
underexplored areas… About one fifth of these resources may be found in contested areas, 
particularly in the Reed Bank at the northeast end of the Spratly Islands, which is claimed by 
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China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. These additional resources are not considered commercial 
reserves at this time; extracting them may not be economically feasible."
111
 
China is speculating on the fact that oil might be found in these areas and has 
constructed a large rig that can drill up to depths of 3.000 meters.
112
 However based on the 
analysis of possible natural resources and where they might be found, it is unlikely that the 
construction of artificial islands in the EEZ of the Philippines has to do with the exploitation 
of these, as the EEZ of the Philippines does not appear to contain many resources. The 
assumption that China is doing this for the natural resources under the seabed therefore seems 
to lack a convincing argument. Consequently, the security angle needs to be examined. 
The South China Sea is a major shipping route that sees over a quarter of total cargo 
shipping and a third of maritime traffic worldwide passing through, with the majority of East 
Asian and Southeast Asian countries being reliant on the region for trade.
113
 Most of China's 
trade and resource imports travel through the South China Sea; as such the protection of the 
region is vital to its economic interests. The region also covers the southern flank of the 
Chinese mainland. The South China Sea disputes and those with other nations such as Japan 
over islands in East Asia correspond with strategic thinking over the defense of the Chinese 
mainland. This is the doctrine of the Island Chains (see figure 5), which is meant to defend 
China from an attack from overseas, from which most of its non Asian enemies such as the 
U.S. would come. These islands chains, a total of three, each one further east into the Pacific, 
would enable a forward defense away from the Chinese mainland, to protect it from hostile 
military action.
114
 The establishment of military bases on the islands in the South China Sea 
fits in the doctrine as part of the First Island Chain, which overlaps with the 9-dash line, the 
chain continues north past the Philippines around Taiwan and stops at Okinawa. China 
preferably would like to see no U.S. forces within this first chain. Currently the U.S. has 
military forces in South Korea and Okinawa within the island chain, with the likely expansion 
of a U.S. presence in the Philippines as well.
115
 The objective of the First Island Chain is to 
close off the South and East China Sea to the United States, creating a buffer zone from which 
to protect China's coastline. 
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In 2011, Chinese officials declared that the Chinese policies in the South China Sea 
were "purely defensive".
116
 That depends on how one perceives defensive. For China, 
claiming that the islands and features are a core and historic part of China, it can be easily 
explained that the military facilities constructed on these features serve a defensive purpose. 
For international law, the Philippines and the United States, these actions are not defensive, 
they are illegal and an aggressive expansion enabling the projection of Chinese military power 
further into the South China Sea. If China built those runways and harbours on the reclaimed 
Spratly islands for peaceful reasons, as China claims, the question remains why one runway 
would not be satisfactory for the peaceful resupply of nearby islands, instead of the three it 
has constructed now.
117
 It is clear that these runways were not built for peaceful purposes, but 
to accommodate military aircraft. China has constructed naval and air facilities such as 
airstrips, radar installations and docks for military means, to accommodate warships and 
aircraft on features in the region, seemingly constructing the South China Sea part of the First 
Island Chain (see figure 6 for an example of construction of military facilities). China has 
been heavily modernizing its armed forces, with a vast naval expansion that has been planned 
since the 1990's, when China became reliant on trade and overseas imports such as oil.
118
 In 
part, China became acutely aware of the need to be able to protect its shores with the Third 
Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, during which the U.S. displayed significant naval power to 
support Taiwan. What the U.S. saw as defensive moves in the Taiwan Strait, China perceived 
as threatening moves by a superpower that could easily deploy a large amount of military 
ships close to the Chinese coastline. This made China aware of its security dilemma when 
looking at the balance of power compared to the United States. The balance of power also 
features in the thinking of the People's Liberation Army and emphasizes security pressures 
that could be relieved, by acquiring and militarizing features in the South China Sea, as You 
describes: 
"the PLA continues to advocate that controllable, pre-emptive, incremental and agile 
moves are imperative to protect China’s core interests and alleviate the pent-up security 
pressures. In fact, during Hu Jintao’s reign, the PLA proposed several times that land 
reclamation was of strategic importance, but the proposal was dismissed. It was Xi who 
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eventually gave the green light to the proposal, as he shared similar sentiments, mentality and 
policy initiatives with the PLA."
119
 
Control over the South China Sea by constructing installations is not enough in itself. 
Currently, the islands are still vulnerable and isolated in the case of a potential conflict. 
However, it is an important step in conjunction with the expansion of the Chinese Navy. The 
Chinese Navy is undergoing rapid expansion, encroaching on or even eclipsing the size of the 
U.S. Pacific Fleet in some ship types, with a lack of carriers being the area China is heavily 
behind in.
120
 China has also been upgrading its ballistic missile-carrying submarine force, 
developing them to be able to reach the U.S. mainland.
121
 This new naval force would need 
the ability to access the open sea, to prevent it from being 'bottled up' in port by a hostile navy, 
for which control over, or denying other powers access to the South China Sea is critical. 
Control over the region would give the Chinese Navy a relatively safe region of open sea 
covered by aircraft and missiles from installations on the Spratlys.
122
 
As the relative sizes of the Chinese and U.S. are getting closer, the U.S. holds a 
distinct technological superiority when it comes to its fleet. But with China rapidly expanding 
its capabilities, its strategic opponent has been left to counter these actions instead of taking 
the initiative on developments.
123
 China's Navy is still very inexperienced, lacking the training, 
skill and experience that the navies of the U.S. and its allies in the region posses.
124
 China's 
primary opponents in the South China Sea disputes, Vietnam and the Philippines, however, do 
not possess the required military hardware to compete with China in the South China Sea, 
with the Philippines being especially dependent on the U.S. in the region due to obsolete 
hardware.
125
 
Nevertheless, China is currently not seeking to actively match U.S. military power. 
What China is focusing on is A2/AD, anti-access/area denial, meant to keep the U.S. away 
from the Chinese mainland. This is being done by the development of weapons such as anti-
ship missiles meant to counter the U.S. carrier dominance, cyber warfare to sabotage the 
technical advantage of the U.S. and methods to kill satellites on which the U.S. military is 
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dependent.
126
 The fact that the U.S. Navy is superior makes the First Island Chain even more 
important, as these military facilities could deploy aircraft and missiles to deter potential 
aggressors, during the years in which the Chinese Navy is still maturing. Military installations 
in the South China Sea will extend the range of the A2/AD strategy as well as prevent the U.S. 
Navy from getting into strike range of the southern part of the Chinese coastline. In a sense 
this would tackle part of the security dilemma that occurs from having an inexperienced 
military branch that is required for the protection of the Chinese mainland. Strategically, 
controlling access in the South China Sea is vital for the protection of the southern flank of 
China.
127
 
China is not ready for a large conflict involving the United States, yet it needs to 
maintain the pressure on its neighbors and appear willing to go to war over the South China 
Sea disputes, so as not to appear weak.
128
 This is incredibly risky, as Chinese actions and the 
tension they cause in the South China Sea may accidently lead to an escalation or incident 
with another claimant, potentially even the United States.
129
 These actions feed the security 
dilemma of China's neighbors and the U.S. in return, because the aggressive actions of China 
in the South China Sea are also cause for increased defense spending in those countries and 
focusing upon China as the potential adversary in the future. Qingguo Jia frames the security 
dilemma from a Chinese perspective for China's neighbors and the potential risks involved: 
"As China rises, the outside world may also take measures such as enhancing existing 
military alliances and forging new military ties in the region, and redeploying more military 
forces to China’s vicinity to hedge against China’s rise, as the United States appears to be 
doing now. Such undertakings are likely to be interpreted as hostile efforts to contain China 
and may make Chinese military responses more likely."
130
 
China's actions have been driven by the security dilemma. In the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century 
China has repeatedly been attacked by foreign powers, mostly from overseas. This history 
gives an important impulse for the security dilemma as China is still concerned about a 
possible attack. The need to construct the First Island Chain can be attributed to an offensive 
realist approach to perceiving the increase of power necessary to defend itself or 'ensure its 
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survival' in a potential conflict with the U.S. The South China Sea disputes and the First 
Island Chain fit into the dilemma, as securing the region would protect the Chinese mainland 
from a possible attack. The military facilities eliminate a certain part of the uncertainty in the 
defense of the Chinese mainland. 
Overall, the decisions to claim the features in the South China Sea and to build up 
military installations on them, seem to have been overwhelmingly done for security and 
power reasons. It has been an attempt of China to resolve some of its security issues, 
addressing the security dilemma it has versus the U.S. Possession of these islands is the first 
step in creating the First Island Chain, meant to keep mainland China safe and shift the 
balance of power somewhat away from U.S. naval dominance. It is a clear neorealist approach 
to security issues and its South China Sea claims. Neither historic rights, international law or 
possible exploitation of resources give a sufficient explanation for motivations behind the 
actions of China.  
35 
 
Conclusion 
 
China's actions in the South China Sea do not follow either the strict defensive realism of 
Waltz, or the offensive realism of Mearsheimer. The actions China has undertaken clearly 
directly damage the interests of the Philippines, as its exclusive economic zone has been the 
site of China's military base constructions. They certainly are not peaceful either, as the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration noted when it ruled that Chinese vessels had created serious 
risk in the region. Whether China will fully follow offensive realism cannot be said at the 
current moment, as hegemonic transition is a key part of offensive realism. Perhaps China 
will endeavor to become a hegemonic power and even try to supplant U.S. hegemony. It is 
hard to say if China's actions in the South China Sea are its first steps on the path that is 
described as hegemonic transition theory. Certain signs of hegemonic transition have taken 
place, such as the undermining or plain ignoring international law by China. 
 China claims that the South China Sea belongs to China, as displayed by the 9-dash 
line. This is a serious breach of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as 
China is violating the rights of other nations under the Convention. The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration case that the Philippines brought against China in 2013, further cements the fact 
that China is the party at fault, conducting illegal activities under the Convention. 
Nevertheless, China continues to maintain it is doing nothing wrong and that it is countries 
like Vietnam and the Philippines that are conducting illegal activities in the jurisdiction of 
China. China will continue to claim historical rights and will not accept any third party 
arbitration, so as to preserve its gains. In this, it clearly follows the early steps of hegemonic 
transition theory and offensive realism in trying to subvert the international system. 
 The neorealist approach of China's actions can be seen in the construction of military 
installations on disputed features: China is intending to stay on these features for a long period 
of time. The natural resources in the South China Sea do no present a convincing argument to 
explain the motivations behind China's assertiveness towards its claims. These military 
installations do. The establishment of these installations is a clear attempt at constructing the 
First Island Chain in the South China Sea. Together with the expansion of the Chinese Navy, 
these islands are aimed at reducing the security dilemma that China currently faces from the 
United States. Aircraft, missiles and a modern navy will, in the future, be able to prevent the 
U.S. from accessing the South China Sea in a potential conflict. 
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 Pushing the claims in the South China Sea and militarizing them is an attempt to shift 
the balance of power in the region to China. China is consolidating its position in the South 
China Sea now, for a mature Chinese navy to be able to exploit. China's initiative in the 
power grab for these islands has left the United States with few options: U.S. ships will 
intrude in what China claims are its 'territorial seas' around the islands, conducting freedom of 
navigation operations, but there is little else the U.S. can do as more direct action can lead to 
conflict. In an offensive realist perspective, this has reduced the power of the United States, 
while China has managed to maximize its gains in the region, for no apparent downside 
beyond damaged diplomatic relations. Time is on the side of China. The relative power 
disparity between China and its competitors in the South China Sea disputes will only 
increase over time, and the relative power disparity with the U.S. will at the same time grow 
smaller. China has succeeded in its first direct competition with the U.S. in the region, having 
undermined the international system and its laws while doing so. 
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Appendix 1: Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: Map of the 9-dash line which shows the area China is claiming as its sovereign 
territory. 
Source: J. Amur, '5 stories you need to read to understand the South China Sea ruling', The 
Washington Post (July 12, 2016). 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/12/5-stories-you-need-to-
read-to-understand-the-south-china-sea-ruling/?utm_term=.25b8b7eb8228 (6-5-2017). 
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2: Overlapping claims in the South China Sea. 
Source: T. Moss, 'Why China and the Philippines are Battling Over Rocks, Reefs', The Wall 
Street Journal (January 25, 2014). https://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2014/01/25/why-
china-and-the-philippines-are-battling-over-rocks-reefs/ (visited 7-6-2017). 
 
 
42 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 3: Map of the South China Sea, with EEZ measured from the mainland of the South 
China Sea countries. 
Source: 'Why is the South China Sea contentious?', BBC News (12 July, 2016). 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349 (visited 7-6-2017). 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 4: Likely oil and natural gas reserves locations in the South China Sea. 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10651 (visited 17-6-17). 
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Figure 5 
 
Figure 5: The First and Second Island Chains, a possible third chain would lie even further 
east, around Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands. 
Source: R. Wingfield-Hayes, 'China's Island Factory', BBC News (9 September, 2014). 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-1446c419-fc55-4a07-9527-a6199f5dc0e2 (visited 
25-6-17). 
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Figure 6 
 
 
Figure 6: Constructing an island on Fiery Cross Reef by China, starting with the beginning of 
the reclamation effort at the top in August of 2014 and showing the completed island and 
subsequent construction of military facilities at bottom in September of 2015. The bottom 
picture clearly shows the construction of military facilities such as a harbour and a runway. 
Source: D. Watkins, 'What China has been building in the South China Sea', The New York 
Times (updated October 27, 2015). 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-
in-the-south-china-sea.html (visited 15-6-17). 
